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ARGUMENT 
MSI/Alta's response to the restrictive covenant issue is notable for three things: 
(1) its lack of legal authority for any of its principal arguments; (2) its lack of record 
support for its factual premises; and (3) its direct contradiction of the governing 
documents. Missing is any legal justification for the granting of summary judgment 
against The View. The error perpetuated below should be corrected by this Court. 
I. THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS OPERATE BY THEIR TERMS TO 
CONTROL AMENDED PLATS, NOT VICE VERSA. 
A. MSI/Alta's Argument Is Backward. 
Boiling the argument down to its essence, MSI/Alta says amendment of the plat 
rendered the restrictive covenant "inoperative and unenforceable." (Reply Br. at 13.) 
MSI/Alta can find no authority for this proposition, either in the language of the 
Restrictive Covenants or in the case law. In fact, this argument is exactly backward. The 
restrictive parking covenant modifies the plat "as amended"; the plat as amended does 
not modify the restrictive parking covenant. (Add. 34-35; R. 367-68.) Not, at least, if the 
language of the Restrictive Covenants is respected. 
MSI/Alta finesses this plain-language obstacle by repeatedly arguing that the 
Amended Plat is "incorporated by reference" into the Restrictive Covenants. (Reply Br. 
at 12, 13 & n.4.) But consider how they are. The Restrictive Covenants say they apply to 
the plat and any amendment to the plat; they do not say, as MSI/Alta argues, that merely 
amending the plat amends the substance of any underlying restrictive covenant. This 
would render the terms of the Restrictive Covenants a nullity - especially the express 
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amendment provisions - and thereby run afoul of core principles of contract 
interpretation established in Utah law. See, e.g., Central Florida Investments v. Parkwest 
Assocs., 2002 UT 3, Tf 12, 40 P.3d 599, 605 (contract construction should not nullify 
express provisions); Swenson v. Erickson, 2000 UT 16, t 11, 998 P.2d 807, 810-11 
(restrictive covenants are contracts subject to all the rules of contract construction). The 
court of appeals' conclusion is a decided anomaly in reported restrictive covenant 
decisions. 
B. "Density" Does Not Equal "Use." 
MSI/Alta dismisses the required written procedures for amending the Declaration 
by arguing they "do not apply" to eliminating a substantive restrictive covenant. (Reply 
Br. at 12.) MSI/Alta's rationale is that the Declarant reserved to itself the right to amend 
the Declaration (and Plat, if necessary) to allocate density or to change the configuration, 
size, or location of its lots. (Reply Br. at 12.) MSI/Alta's argument is a non sequitur for 
two reasons. First, the Declarant never amended the Declaration as required by the very 
language MSI/Alta relies upon. (Add. 79 § 13.2, R. 412, requiring amendment to "this 
Declaration" as well as to "the Map, if necessary" for amendment to take effect; Add. 80 
§ 13.4, R. 413, requiring a special Amendment Instrument acknowledged by the Board 
and recorded with the County Recorder for amendment to take effect). Second, and more 
importantly, the right reserved to the Declarant did not include the unilateral right to 
eliminate substantive restrictive covenants. 
In this regard MSI/Alta stretches the limiting language of the reservation clause 
beyond recognition, announcing that allowing a different allocation of an established 
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density is the equivalent of allowing a unilateral change of use. (Reply Br. at 12-13.) 
MSI/Alta carries this argument to an extreme, referring first to the allowed change of 
"density" as "density/use" and ultimately morphing it to "density and use." (Reply Br. at 
13, 14 n.4, emphasis added.) This is absurd. MSI/Alta understandably cites no authority 
for this proposition. But language and logic, as well as reasoned case law, demonstrate 
that the distinction between density and use is a distinction with a difference. See, e.g., 
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary p. 339 (defining "density" as "quantity per . . 
. unit area"); id. p. 1299 (defining "use" as "the legal enjoyment of property that consists 
in its employment, occupation, exercise, or practice"); Ivancovich v. City of Tucson Bd. of 
Adjustment, 529 P.2d 242, 248 (Ariz. App. 1974) (density regulations included in area 
variance do "not affect the use of the land") (emphasis added); compare Declaration 
Article III ("Use Restrictions") with § 2.15 ("Density") (Add. 42-46, 37; R. 375-79, 370). 
MSI/Alta supports its position by parroting a hypothetical posed by the court of 
appeals. (Reply Br. at 12-13.) In a footnote, the court of appeals rejected the plain 
language of the Restrictive Covenants that applies the parking covenant to Lot 5 as 
amended. (Ct. App. Op. Tf 28 n.l.) The court posited that, notwithstanding the 
Declaration's requirements, Sorenson could have reconfigured the location or size of Lot 
5 to make it wholly impractical as a parking designation. (Id.) The court suggested this 
would technically comply with the contract while operating to deprive The View of the 
benefits of the contract, thereby leading to an unacceptably absurd result. (Id.) 
This unsupported hypothetical wholly ignores the duty of good faith inherent in 
every contract. See St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 199-
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200 (Utah 1991). Any action to render an express restrictive covenant ineffective in this 
manner would be an actionable breach. See id. at 200. Notably, there is no material 
difference between the hypothetical the court of appeals posed and what MSI/Alta has 
actually argued - that the restrictive parking covenant can be eliminated altogether by 
unilateral action without regard to the benefits anticipated in the contract. By its own 
analogy, the court of appeals demonstrates the need for the redress provided at law for the 
violation of contractual provisions. 
MSI/Alta's argument makes for bad contract law and policy. Under MSI/Alta5s 
analysis the majority amendment procedures would never be implicated. Instead, any 
substantive land restrictions could be unilaterally destroyed and amendment procedures 
bypassed altogether simply by framing the action after the fact as a change in density 
allocation or lot configuration, size, and location. Such an approach ignores the plain 
meaning of the English language and the ordinary usage of land planning parlance. 
The case law illustrates circumstances in which wholesale unilateral rights have 
effectively been reserved to the declarant and properly invoked. See, e.g., Dyegard Land 
Partnership v. Hoover, 39 S.W. 3d 300, 305 (Tex. App. 2001) (reserving to Developer 
"the right to alter or amend these restrictions," which it did in a written amendment); Rosi 
v. McCoy, 356 S.E.2d 568, 569 (N.C. 1987) (reserving to Developers "the right to amend, 
modify or vacate any restriction," which they did in a written amendment). Such 
provisions were identified and discussed in The View's opening brief (pp. 39-40) and 
unanswered by MSI/Alta. In contrast to those decisions, the Declarant's unilateral rights 
in the instant case were specifically restricted to allow only limited changes that do not 
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include eliminating substantive covenants. Consequently, those covenants remain in full 
force and effect. 
C. This Court Does Not Recognize Implied Restrictive Covenants, 
MSI/Alta's argument urges precisely what this Court's jurisprudence forbids: an 
implied amendment to the Restrictive Covenants. See Dansie v. Hi-Country Estates 
Homeowners Ass Vi, 1999 UT 62, 987 P.2d 30. Dansie is directly on point. There has 
been no written amendment to the Restrictive Covenants. Suggesting the Plat can do it, 
as the court of appeals did, cannot be squared with the plain language of the Declaration. 
The disconnect between the documents and the decision below is evidenced most 
forcefully by MSI/Alta's statement that "the original parking covenant has no application 
to the amended Lot 5." (Reply Br. at 14.) Juxtapose this argument against the language 
of the covenants themselves providing the Restrictive Covenants apply to the plat as 
amended. (Add. 33 § 1.13, 34 § 1.19, 35 § 1.25, 42 § 3.1; R. 366-68, 375.) The legal 
error in the lower court's decision is self-evident.1 
The View was and is entitled to rely on the plain language of the Restrictive 
Covenants. MSI/Alta suggests that summary judgment in its favor is appropriate even 
though the spin it puts on the construction of the Amended Plat on its face contradicts the 
1
 Despite protesting it is not making an implied amendment argument, MSI/Alta calls the 
right to change the use of the lots an "inherent" right that appears, apparently, within the 
penumbra of those rights actually listed. (Reply Br. at 12.) A non-explicit, "inherent" 
right is an implied one. See St. Benedict's Dev. Co., 811 P.2d at 199 (interchangeably 
using the terms "inheres" and "impliedly promises" when discussing implied covenant of 
good faith). 
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plain language of the Restrictive Covenants. MSI/Alta necessarily has to focus on 
characterizing the Amended Plat to the exclusion of reading the Restrictive Covenants in 
suggesting that The View could possibly have been put on notice about the implied 
"amendment" to the Restrictive Covenants allegedly effected by a change of the map. 
How the lower court could reach an implied amendment conclusion as a matter of law is 
not explained. This is especially true when the Amended Plat itself does not state it is 
eliminating or modifying any of the Restrictive Covenants but instead refers to the 
"Master Declaration" as if its provisions remained in full force and effect. (See Add. 86-
87; see also infra part II, discussing more fully the actual content of the Amended Plat.) 
Finally, MSI/Alta's unsupported statement that "[t]he material facts are not in 
dispute" (Reply Br. at 1) is made without actually discussing the material record fact 
disputes raised by MSI/Alta's motion and cited by The View in its opening brief at pages 
30-31. If summary judgment for The View is not appropriate, these material disputes at 
the least require denial of MSI/Alta's cross-motion. Under any appropriate view of the 
record, judgment for MSI/Alta as a matter of law should be reversed. 
II. THE PARKING COVENANT UNEQUIVOCALLY RUNS WITH THE 
LAND. 
The Restrictive Covenants explicitly say in two places they run with the land. 
(Add. 31, 79; R. 364, 412.) These provisions have not been amended. Moreover, there 
has been no showing by clear and convincing evidence that they were set aside - let alone 
any acknowledgment of this high standard. 
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MSI/Alta suggests merely amending the plat caused covenants explicitly running 
with the land to lose their effect. (Reply Br. at 15.) MSI/Alta cites absolutely no legal 
authority for this proposition. This idea contradicts basic principles of restrictive 
covenants in general and covenants running with the land in particular and finds no basis 
in the jurisprudence of this or any other common law court. 
MSI/Alta tries for the first time ever in this litigation to distinguish Flying 
Diamond Oil Corp. v. Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618 (Utah 1989), arguing that the 
surface owner's payment right was not transferable and that the original obligor had not 
agreed to terminate the covenants. (Reply Br. at 15.) The case does not turn on those 
phantom distinctions and is not distinguishable on those bases. First, in Flying Diamond 
the payment covenants were not transferable separate from the surface ownership 
because they were covenants running with the land. See id. at 621. Second, the original 
obligor (Newton & Sons Sheep Co.) could no more act in contravention of the covenant 
than could its successor in interest (Newton Sheep Co.). See id. Flying Diamond is good 
law that holds restrictive covenants remain in force notwithstanding futile efforts by one 
or more parties to act in violation thereof. 
Notably in the case at bar, the recording of the Amended Plat did not itself purport 
to extinguish any Restrictive Covenant; but if it had, Flying Diamond teaches that such 
efforts are ineffectual. On its face, the Amended Plat itself does no more than change the 
2
 Any argument attempting to distinguish Flying Diamond on this or any other basis was 
waived below and should not be considered for the first time on appeal. (See footnote 7 
to The View's opening brief, noting MSI/Alta's failure to raise or brief this issue below.) 
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density of Lots 4 and 5 from 85 to 65 units and of Lots 8 and 9 from 40 units to 60. 
(Add. 86.) There is no indication of noted density changes permanently eliminating any 
use of Lot 5 (indeed the original plat, like the amended plat, spoke in terms of 
"Anticipated Dwelling Density" and "Residential Units" when discussing density); of 
significantly changing Lots 8 and 5; or of eliminating restrictive covenants. {Compare 
Add. 86-87 with Add. 84-85.) To the contrary, the Declaration's density allocation 
reservation still exists, as does the Amended Plat's reference to the Restrictive Covenants 
as remaining viable going forward. (Add. 86-87.) Both the original and amended plats 
maintain the density limit set forth in the Restrictive Covenants. (Add. 84-87.) If there is 
any question about these issues, the record shows MSI represented to the Alta Town 
Council that the alterations in the Amended Plat were "minor" and that the "units 
allocated are essentially the same." (R. 504.) MSI/Alta has utterly failed at any time in 
the course of this litigation to show by clear and convincing evidence that the parking 
covenant "terminated" prior to conveyance of the land, as it now argues, let alone that it 
do so as a matter of law. 
Lastly, The View does not "concede" the notice ascribed to it by MSI/Alta. 
(Reply Br. at 16 n.5.) MSI/Alta outright misrepresents The View's argument, which is 
that The View had both actual and constructive notice of the unamended Restrictive 
Covenants. (View Br. at 28.) The View's deed incorporates by reference the Restrictive 
Covenants, including the restrictive parking covenant. Summary judgment against The 
View cannot be sustained on such a record. See Judkins v. Toone, 492 P.2d 980, 982 
308224v 1 8 
(Utah 1972) (holding summary judgment inappropriate when recitals in deed contradict 
moving party's argument). 
III. THE "AMBIGUITY" ANALYSIS DESCRIBED BY MSI/ALTA IS 
FLAWED. 
MSI/Alta's proposition is an astounding one: that summary judgment 
contradicting the plain language of restrictive covenants should be sustained. This Court 
should reject that argument. 
Both the View and MSI/Alta agree that the Restrictive Covenants are 
unambiguous. Notwithstanding this agreement, the court of appeals held the Restrictive 
Covenants were ambiguous. Either way, The View's position has always been that 
summary judgment cannot be granted against The View when the plain language of the 
Restrictive Covenants reads as it does.4 
It is unclear what analysis MSI/Alta is employing. MSI/Alta argues that "no 
ambiguity analysis is required," but simultaneously argues the effect of extrinsic 
evidence. (Reply Br. at 16-18.) Even if extrinsic evidence were considered, however, 
summary judgment is inappropriate. 
To avoid any confusion, this Court should undertake a proper, de novo ambiguity 
analysis under Utah law. 
Notably, MSI/Alta never once addresses the controlling Judkins decision either in its 
rogue opening brief or in its reply. 
4
 Despite MSI/Alta's feeble attempt at characterizations, The View has never argued this 
contract is ambiguous. (Reply Br. at 16.) 
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A. The Restrictive Covenants Are Unambiguous 
The first step is to determine whether the Restrictive Covenants are ambiguous, 
which is a legal determination for the Court. See Swenson, 2000 UT 16,1f 11, 998 P.2d 
807, 810-11. If they are unambiguous, the Court construes them as a matter of law. See 
id. Here, all parties agree there is no ambiguity. (View Br. at 34; MSI/Alta Opening Br. 
at 30; Reply Br. at 16.) This should resolve the question. See J.M. Beals Enters., Inc. v. 
Industrial Hard Chrome, Ltd., 551 N.E.2d 340, 342 (111. App. 1990) ("When parties agree 
that the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, then construing the contract is a 
matter of law appropriate for summary judgment.").5 
"When parties disagree over the meaning of an unambiguous contract, the court 
must determine the intent of the parties. This determination must be based upon the 
objective intent of the parties as expressed in the agreement, and not their present 
interpretation." Hutchings v. Chevron U.S.A., 862 S.W.2d 752, 756 (Tex. App. 1993) 
(emphasis added); see also Seoane v. Drug Emporium, 457 S.E.2d 93, 96 (Va. 1995) 
(court simply gives language its plain meaning when both parties agree contract language 
is unambiguous). This should end the analysis with the Court pronouncing what the 
contract means. Here, The View submits the contract means what it says. 
5
 Even if the Court were independently to analyze whether the Declaration is ambiguous, 
it should reach the same result. The Court may look to any evidence inside or outside the 
contract in making its ambiguity determination. See Ward v. Intermountain Farmers 
Ass 'n., 907 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah 1995). Here, neither party points outside the contract to 
argue ambiguity. 
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If, on the other hand, the Court believes the Restrictive Covenants are ambiguous, 
the analysis continues as a factual one. 
B. If the Restrictive Covenants Are Ambiguous, the Issue Becomes a Jury 
Question. 
If the Restrictive Covenants are ambiguous, the jury resolves the issue. See 
Colonial Leasing Co. of New England, Inc. v. Larsen Bros. Const. Co., 731 P.2d 483, 488 
(Utah 1986); WebBank v. American Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88, f 19, 54 P.3d 
1139, 1145. The Court may not take this determination away from a jury when evidence 
supports the non-moving party's factual interpretation. See, e.g., Smith v. Four Corners 
Mental Health Ctr., 2003 UT 23, f 40, 70 P.3d 904, 915. 
Assuming, arguendo, a factual analysis is appropriate, the court of appeals erred 
by holding the extrinsic evidence does not raise a factual dispute.6 The View's evidence 
has been laid out in detail for the Court on pages 30-31 of The View's opening brief. It 
includes the fact no written amendment was ever made to the Restrictive Covenants as 
called for by the contract itself. This is a significant piece of evidence that of itself may 
be dispositive. See, e.g., Howe v. Professional Manivest, Inc., 829 P.2d 160, 164 (Utah 
App. 1990) (if parties intended result, they could have said so in their contract); cf 
Dyegard Land Partnership, 39 S.W.3d 300, 305 (Tex. App. 2001) (amending restrictive 
covenants with written amendment pursuant to terms of covenants); Rosi v. McCoy, 356 
6
 The court below observed that The View did not adduce any "testimony" to rebut Mr. 
Plumb's testimony of Sorenson's intent. (Ct. App. Op. If 26.) This is true but irrelevant. 
MSI/Alta restates this proposition to say The View presented no "evidence." (Reply Br. 
at 18.) As shown in the text, this clearly is not true. 
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S.E.2d 568 (N.C. 1987) (same). Moreover, The View's deed incorporated the 
unamended Restrictive Covenants as applied to the Amended Plat. (R. 417-18.) And the 
Amended Plat itself refers to the ongoing viability of the Restrictive Covenants. (Add. 
87.) These are significant, if not dispositive, facts from which a jury could find for The 
View under a factual analysis. MSI/Alta ignores these and other disputed facts 
altogether, labeling them as "immaterial" or as "legal conclusions." (Reply Br. at 19 
n.6.) MSI/Alta provides no support for its conclusory description of The View's material 
facts and obviously has no answer for them. (Reply Br. at 19 n.6.) This Court can see 
them for the material facts they are. 
When such facts are considered in the light most favorable to The View - and 
further in light of the circumstances under which MSI/Alta obtained Walter Plumb's 
testimony - Mr. Plumb's credibility also becomes an important issue. This is wholly 
appropriate on summary judgment, especially when objective evidence shows reasons to 
question his credibility. See, e.g., Powell v. Viking Ins. Co., 722 P.2d 1343 (Wash. 1986) 
(summary judgment not properly granted when credibility issues exist involving more 
than collateral matters); see also State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993) 
(reviewing court may even reassess credibility when testimony inherently improbable). 
Summary judgment cannot properly be granted against The View on this record. 
7
 The Affidavit of Russell Watts, argued by MSI/Alta, was submitted for the first time in 
reply in the summary judgment proceedings and should not be considered. (See footnote 
9 on page 31 of The View's opening brief, discussing this point in detail.) 
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IV. AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE VIEW NEVER "ABANDONED" ITS 
RIGHT TO ENFORCE THE RESTRICTIVE PARKING COVENANT. 
MSI/Alta's last argument is full of unsupported assertions. MSI/Alta provides no 
record support - and there is none - for the following primary assertions it makes: (1) 
that the parking covenant was "forgotten" for fifteen years; (2) that the parking covenant 
"has been continuously violated for fifteen years"; (3) that "no owner from any lot has 
sought enforcement of the covenant until now"; (4) that The View has "sufficient 
parking" on its lot; and (5) that a central parking facility on Lot 5 has become 
"unnecessary." (Reply Br. at 19-20.) The Court should disregard these bald assertions. 
See Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2005 UT 98, Tf 21, 104 P.3d 1208, 1213 (declining to 
consider factual assertions unsupported by the record or not properly cited). 
MSI/Alta's legal argument on this point is likewise unsupported: MSI/Alta cites 
no decisional law backing up its conclusions. (Reply Br. at 19, 20 n.7.) There is no case 
law authority for the proposition that non-enforcement of a covenant based on lack of 
need for enforcement is the analytical equivalent of a repeated violation. Indeed, this 
idea runs directly contrary to the case law. See, e.g., Thayer v. Thompson, 677 P.2d 787, 
789 (Wash. App. 1984). 
MSI/Alta also misconstrues the documents. The documents do not say, and The 
View is not arguing, that either MSI or Alta has an "affirmative duty" to "construct a 
parking facility on Lot 5." (Reply Br. at 20 n.7.) Restrictive covenants are just that: they 
restrict the use of land. When MSI/Alta proceeded with a use of Lot 5 inconsistent with 
the Restrictive Covenants, The View commenced suit in response. The law is clear that 
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the passage of time in and of itself does not make the covenant go away. See Thayer, 611 
P.2d at 789. If there is any doubt about this, the Restrictive Covenants themselves 
provide an explicit duration of 50 years. (Add. 79 § 12.12; R. 412.) As with all other 
aspects of this case, MSI/Alta would rather the Court not read the Restrictive Covenants 
themselves. But they comprise the controlling provisions. 
MSI/Alta also argues that it is no longer possible to realize to a substantial degree 
the benefits intended through the restrictive covenant. It is hard to see how MSI/Alta can 
make this brand new argument in good faith. There is clearly no record support for it. 
The View anticipates receiving the salient benefit of its bargain in this subdivision as 
promised by the Sugarplum Declaration. It has appealed to this Court in an effort to 
secure the rights it purchased. See, e.g., Kraatz v. Heritage Imps., 2003 UT App 201, f 4, 
71, P.3d 188, 192 (parties entitled to benefit of their bargain). 
Finally, both the Swenson and Fink decisions demonstrate how far off base 
MSI/Alta's abandonment argument really is. See Swenson v. Erickson, 2000 UT 16, 998 
P.2d 807; Fink v. Miller, 896 P.2d 649 (Utah App. 1995). In both of those cases, there 
were repeated direct violations of the restrictive covenant. After these had taken place 
over many years, the plaintiffs tried to enforce the covenants at issue. The courts in each 
of those cases had no problem determining that the covenants had been abandoned. That 
is simply not the case here. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons and for those set forth in The View's opening brief and 
in the record as a whole, this Court should reverse the court of appeals' decision refusing 
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to enforce the unambiguous Restrictive Covenants encumbering Lot 5 of the Sugarplum 
o 
Subdivision in Alta. 
,th DATED this 4m day of April, 2005. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
By: 
Robert E. Mansfield 
Stephen K. Christiansen 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Cross-Petitioner, and 
Respondent The View Condominium Owners 
Association 
The View has neither renewed its prior motion to strike nor continued to argue matters 
previously settled. (Reply Br. at 20 n.8.) The View has asked the Court to provide 
guidance to other appellate litigants and their counsel so that double-briefing issues on 
cross-petitions does not become the norm in this Court - which it will if the improper 
practice exploited in this case is not curbed. The mere fortuity of one party obtaining the 
"Petitioner" designation by filing a certiorari request a few minutes before a "Cross-
Petitioner" should not bestow an unfair procedural advantage by allowing an extra brief. 
MSI/Alta's case law citations have no bearing on this point. 
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Merrill F. Nelson 
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